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Forthcoming in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed.) (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013)
COPYRIGHT, CUSTOM, AND LESSONS FROM THE COMMON LAW
Jennifer E. Rothman∗
One of the foundational features of early English common law was its use of custom to
set legal rules. At that time, the common law used the term “custom” to encompass the practices
and norms both of the entire kingdom and of particular communities. Prior to an organized legal
system, practices and norms regulated local behavior and facilitated the resolution of disputes.
As legal systems in England began to develop, custom shaped, guided, and often defined the law.
The incorporation of custom by courts served an important role in getting communities to
support the authority of the growing judiciary. Today, custom—particularly in the form of
industry practices and social norms—remains an important tool in common law adjudication.
One might think that because of the dominance of statutory frameworks governing
today’s intellectual property laws, custom would have a limited or even a non-existent role in
determining the scope of intellectual property rights. Perhaps because of this initial impression
scholars have often overlooked or dismissed the impact of custom on intellectual property law.
Elsewhere I have refuted this common misperception and documented the frequent consideration
and incorporation of custom into intellectual property law. 1 Custom shapes the scope of
privileges afforded to intellectual property owners, and the access and use rights of the public.
When courts have considered custom in the context of intellectual property, they often have used
industry practices to limit use and access rights. These courts, however, have not engaged with
the important question of whether these particular customs are worthy of consideration and even
if they are, whether they should rise to the level of a dispositive legal rule. I contend that custom
should rarely be determinative of a particular legal inquiry, but it can (if appropriately cabined)
provide some meaningful evidence for a number of inquiries in intellectual property cases. 2
In this essay, I focus on one important facet of the subject of what role custom should
play in intellectual property law—how longstanding common law principles should inform our
understanding of custom. The common law provides a number of lessons on how to
appropriately limit the consideration of custom in intellectual property law and elsewhere. In this
discussion, I will use copyright law and its fair use doctrine as the primary lens through which to
consider custom. Copyright is a particularly important example of the incorporation of custom
not only because it is representative of the treatment of custom in intellectual property more
broadly, but also because a number of recent efforts to expand the scope of permissible uses of
others’ copyrighted works have relied on custom.
I begin by considering the traditional role of custom in the common law. I then consider
several of the ways that courts have incorporated custom into copyright law, particularly in the
context of determining fair use. I also discuss recent efforts to use custom to ameliorate both the
uncertainty of fair use and copyright’s ever-expanding boundaries. I next critique the unreflected
reliance on custom and consider appropriate limits on custom’s role, taking into consideration the
traditional common law limits on the use of custom. Finally, I suggest a number of useful
insights (other than the provision of legal rules) that custom provides for copyright law.
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF CUSTOM AT COMMON LAW
Under common law dating at least to the late 1400s in England, “general customs”
formed the basis of the law itself. William Blackstone, one of the foremost commentators on
early common law, writing in the 1700s, defined the common law as “[t]hat ancient collection of
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unwritten maxims and customs [that] had subsisted immemorially.” 3 The two main advantages of
using longstanding community (either local or kingdom-wide) customs were that they were
thought to be “universally known” and were viewed as originating with the communities and
people rather than being imposed by the King. 4 Accordingly, communities were more willing to
defer to these custom-based legal rules that largely reflected their prior understanding of
appropriate conduct.
Blackstone distinguished these general customs from those that were particular to a
specific locality or community. Local or particular customs could sometimes trump general
custom or the common law—which governed kingdom-wide—when applied within the relevant
community. Much of the Blackstonian discussion of particular customs focused on their role in
defining the scope of public use and access rights to private land. In contrast to property
doctrines like prescription, custom permitted access and use not by a particular person but by the
broader public.
There are numerous examples of the public obtaining access and use rights to private
property on the basis of custom; for example, English courts held—on the basis of customary
use—that the public could hold annual dances, conduct horse races, play cricket, fish, gather
wood, and graze animals on various private lands. 5 Carol Rose has described many of these
customary uses as “recreational” in nature and preferred because they support social engagement
and connections in a community. 6 Many of the uses were also of a subsistence nature. During the
enclosure movement in England beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
landowners increasingly excluded citizens from land that they had previously relied on for food
and fuel. 7 The English historian E.P. Thompson describes custom during this period as a
response to this enclosure of land. The customary use arguments challenged efforts by property
owners to move property in the direction of a virtually absolute right. 8 The concept of property
providing an absolute right to exclude others now dominates property discourse, but at the time
of the enclosure movement this understanding of property was still very much contested.
Having briefly considered the traditional role of custom at common law, I will next
consider custom in a very different context and era—copyright law and particularly more recent
evaluations of the fair use defense by American courts. Although I agree with those scholars who
have criticized analogies between intellectual property and real property, 9 the commonalities of
the customary use discussions are significant. To the extent that they are different, the nonrivalrous nature of copyrighted works weighs in favor of more liberal rather than more restrictive
customary use rights. This is so because uses of intellectual property do not deplete the resource
or diminish the property itself. If unchecked, such uses may reduce the value of the intellectual
property or perhaps interfere with its distribution, but greater latitude may be appropriate given
the ability of multiple parties to use the same intangible work at the same time.
THE INCORPORATION OF CUSTOM INTO COPYRIGHT LAW
Although custom does not have the same hallowed status as it once did, custom continues
to play an important role in American jurisprudence. Rather than being the preferred starting
point for any legal rule, the status of custom is now contested and debated. Different areas of law
(and different inquiries within those areas) treat custom differently. In tort law, for example,
there have been ongoing debates about whether the development of customary safety precautions
by a particular industry should be an absolute defense to tort liability, no defense at all, or simply
some evidence of negligence or lack thereof. The dominant contemporary principle—though
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with a few notable exceptions—is that custom should be some evidence of reasonable care, but
not its measure. 10 In property law, courts and scholars continue to debate whether the public’s
longstanding use of land can form the basis of a right to access and use private property. This
issue has often arisen in the context of public access to beaches that are privately owned. 11 In
contract law, scholars and courts have disagreed about whether industry practices should be read
into contracts as implied terms and also, less controversially, whether such practices should
inform the interpretation of existing contract terms. 12
Despite longstanding discussions of custom in other areas of the law, only recently have
intellectual property scholars begun to consider in any depth the role of custom in the field. Yet,
intellectual property rules, both as a de facto and de jure matter, incorporate many practices and
norms that shape the scope of intellectual property rights. In copyright law, custom has affected
determinations of authorship, ownership, copyrightability (such as whether something is
original), and whether a use is infringing—especially whether something is an idea or
expression, or a scènes à faire. Custom has most frequently been considered in evaluating
whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is a fair use and therefore not infringing. I will
primarily focus here on the fair use doctrine and the role of custom in defining its parameters.
If a use of a copyrighted work is fair, then a person or entity can use a copyrighted work
without permission or payment. There are no bright-line rules, however, for determining when a
use is fair. Instead, Congress has set forth a four-factor analysis to assist courts in evaluating fair
uses. The four factors consider the purpose and character of the use (in particular, whether it is
commercial or for nonprofit educational use); the nature of the underlying work; the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and finally, the
effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 13 The preamble of the
statutory fair use section states that uses of copyrighted works for “criticism, comment, news,
reporting, teaching[,] scholarship and research, [are] not an infringement of copyright.” 14 The
terms of the fair use statute largely grew out of the common law development of a fair use
defense. 15 The codification of fair use was intended to incorporate the common law, but still
leave open room for the continued development of the doctrine by the courts. 16
Custom most often arises in fair use analysis in two ways. First, under the codified fair
use factors, courts look to custom to evaluate the market effects of a particular use of a
copyrighted work. Courts often consider failure to pay the “customary price” of a work as
dispositive of the fair use determination. This focus on customary pricing in copyright decisions
stems in part from the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., Inc. 17 In Harper & Row, the Court looked at customary practices to determine
whether a use was commercial in the context of the first fair use factor: “The crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price.” 18
The “customary price” analysis, although ostensibly a factor-one inquiry, fits more
appropriately into the logic of factor four which evaluates harm to the actual and potential
markets for a work. When there is a custom to license a copyrighted work or a genre of works,
courts often hold that failure to pay that price amounts to market harm even when the uses would
otherwise be good candidates for fair use. In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, for
example, the producers of a television sitcom used a poster of the plaintiff’s artwork in the
background of a set without permission. The poster was visible for less than thirty seconds, was
never the focal point of any shot, was not referred to in the dialogue, and was lawfully
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purchased. 19 Nevertheless, the court rejected a fair use defense in the case because the producers
had not followed the television and film industry practice of licensing copyrighted works used as
set dressing. The defendants had therefore failed to pay the “customary price,” and could not
benefit from the fair use defense. Other courts, including the district court in Ringgold, that have
not considered custom in their analyses have held to the contrary and concluded that such uses of
copyrighted works in the background of television and film sets are either de minimis or fair. 20
Unsurprisingly, when courts put consideration of custom into the mix outside of the context of
set dressing, we also see the frequent rejection of fair use defenses if defendants fail to conform
to industry licensing norms; for example, short samples of music, the incidental display of
sunglasses in an advertisement, course packets for classes at universities, and copies of articles
for private researchers have all been judged infringing in large part because licensing such uses is
the dominant practice in each instance. 21
A second way that courts consider custom in the fair use context is to treat custom as
reflective of what is “fair” in a more colloquial, gut-check sense of the word. When defendants
do not follow industry practices or community or self-developed norms, they are viewed as
wrong-doers not deserving of a fair use (or First Amendment) defense to their copying. In Roy
Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, Inc., for example, both a district court and the Second
Circuit held that failing to license film clips when it was industry custom to do so was unethical
and a basis for rejecting both fair use and First Amendment defenses to copyright infringement. 22
In Roy Export, CBS aired a retrospective on the great film actor and director Charlie Chaplin
soon after his death. CBS incorporated footage from both Chaplin’s copyrighted and
uncopyrighted films in its broadcast without licensing the footage. In upholding a substantial jury
verdict, the district court rejected a fair use defense on the grounds that “CBS’s conduct violated
not only its own guidelines but also industry standards of ethical behavior.” The district court
pointed to the industry’s licensing practices as evidence of harm to the potential market for the
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works and of “bad faith.” 23 In affirming the district court, the Second
Circuit pointed to the same lack of conformity with in-house guidelines and industry practices as
evidence of “commercial immorality,” and as a basis for rejecting CBS’s First Amendment
defense. 24
Similarly, nonconformity with more formal industry practices, such as use guidelines, has
also been viewed as unfair. Most notably, the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying
in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions, usually shortened to the “Classroom Guidelines,” has
been very influential in determining the scope of fair use in the context of classroom use of
copyrighted materials. 25 The Classroom Guidelines were developed during the drafting of the
1976 Copyright Act at the behest of Congress. The Guidelines were developed and negotiated
primarily by large publishers and a few author organizations with minimal to no input from
educators and students. The Classroom Guidelines set forth recommended principles for
determining when it is “fair” or lawful to use another’s copyrighted work in an educational
setting. These guidelines, which were never adopted by statute, restrict how copyrighted works
are used by educators and greatly influence courts when they analyze fair use claims. The
extreme specificity of the Classroom Guidelines stands in stark contrast to the open-ended nature
of the statutory and common law fair use criteria, greatly restricting the possible uses of
copyrighted works. Although the Classroom Guidelines purport to set forth the “minimum”
allowable uses, they have come to set a ceiling on allowable educational uses of materials. Not
only is there vast conformity with the standards, but courts have routinely rejected fair use and
found infringement when a party has not conformed to the purported floor of the Guidelines. 26
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This is true both because the nonconformity with the Guidelines is viewed as ethically unfair,
and also because it demonstrates that the defendant is not paying the customary price.
Despite being problematic, it is not surprising that custom has been influential in the
context of fair use determinations. The fair use doctrine is challenging for courts to apply. Fair
use analysis has been termed “muddled,” “troublesome,” and “ad hoc.” 27 As courts seek
guidance through the fair use “thicket,” 28 they sometimes turn to custom. A similar dynamic
played out in the courts over the challenging determination of what is negligent conduct. Custom
is an attractive proxy, but it is ultimately not a fully satisfying basis for determining negligence
or fair use. Just as custom in the context of torts may allow obsolete and dangerous practices to
remain in place in the face of technological innovations, overreliance on custom in the copyright
context could write fair use out of the law.
Another reason courts turn to custom in the copyright context is that at common law
courts referred to fair uses as those that were both “reasonable and customary.” 29 Considering
whether uses are customary has therefore long been a part of fair use analysis even though the
statute no longer refers to this standard. The common law inquiry, however, was not solely about
whether a use was customary. Instead, it had the additional component that required courts to
also consider whether the practice was reasonable, regardless of whether it was customary. Many
courts have ignored this independent reasonableness inquiry and treat what is customary as
definitional of what is reasonable.
In sum, courts routinely consider industry practices and guidelines to evaluate fair use.
This reliance on custom presents a number of significant concerns: First, the quality and
reasonableness of the customs are not considered and therefore their incorporation risks the legal
adoption of suboptimal and inappropriate practices and norms. Second, because of the
dominance of a clearance culture—in which risk-averse licensing practices dominate –
consideration of custom risks making fair use obsolete. Finally, the incorporation of custom in
many contexts has been one-sided—with courts often pointing to non-conformity with practices
to reject fair use, but dismissing conformity with norms or practices as a basis to accept a fair use
defense.
THE PROMISE OF CUSTOM AND FAIR USE PROBLEM-SOLVING
Scholars and various use communities have recently sought out custom as a basis to
delineate and establish fair uses. This interest in custom is not only driven by efforts to persuade
courts to accept defenses in individual cases, but also by efforts to convince and empower
individuals, organizations and companies to assert fair use rather than to conform with the
dominant, risk-averse clearance culture. Just as the enclosure movement in England sparked
arguments in favor of granting customary use rights to the public in the walled-off land, concerns
over the increased propertization of intangible works that can form crucial pieces of our
identities and culture has generated efforts to articulate justifications for public use of these
works. The same tensions exist now as did then between those who worry about the tragedy of
the commons—if land or IP is not exclusively owned—and those who worry about the opposite
problem, the tragedy of the anti-commons—if everything is owned. Thus, it is unsurprising to
see similar arguments about customary uses percolating up at this juncture in history.
The burgeoning best practices movement is a prime example of this. Most notably, the
best practices statements developed by Peter Jaszi, Patricia Aufderheide, and others at American
University and its Center for Social Media seek to establish what should be considered fair use in
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particular communities based on the purported practices in those communities, as well as
community-generated guidelines. The Center for Social Media continues to produce more and
more of these best practices statements—most recently ones for the poetry community and
academic and research libraries. Harvard’s Berkman Center for the Internet and Society, the
American Library Association, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation also have endorsed the
use of best practices statements to facilitate the assertion and support of fair use.
The most well-known of the best practices statements is the Documentary Filmmakers’
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use. The Filmmakers’ Statement presents four categories of
uses of others’ copyrighted works that are likely fair in the context of documentary films. The
privileged categories are critique or commentary, illustrative quoting, incidental uses, and use in
historical sequences. Each of these categories contains a number of “limitations.” Such
limitations include, for example, that illustrative quoting or copying should be properly
attributed, derived from different sources, “no longer than necessary to achieve the intended
effect,” and not used to avoid “the cost or inconvenience of shooting equivalent footage.” 30
Elsewhere I have critiqued the best practices statements on a variety of grounds,
including that they exhibit some wishful thinking about fair use and contain some problematic
limitations that exceed those required by fair use law. 31 Here, however, I want to focus on the
aspects of the statements that relate to custom. Proponents of the best practices statements and
other forms of fair use guidelines have both explicitly—and sometimes implicitly—adopted a
model of copyright law that incorporates custom as law. The Filmmakers’ Statement, for
example, declares that “[f]air use is shaped in part, by the practice of the professional
communities that employ it. . . . [F]or any particular field of critical or creative activity, such as
documentary filmmaking, lawyers and judges consider professional expectations and practice in
assessing what is ‘fair’ within the field.” 32 This statement oversells the impact of industry
practices in determining fair use, while at the same time also underselling the incorporation of
industry practices to limit the scope of permissible uses. Because the best practices statements
expressly endorse the role of custom in determining the scope of fair use, they risk becoming
ceilings rather than floors on fair use. Alternatively, they might simply be dismissed as outlying
practices or even non-practices that are more akin to wishful thinking by piratical users. Instead,
courts are likely to embrace the more dominant clearance culture practices. Rather than
challenging the validity of incorporating such restrictive practices, the statements endorse a
world view that accepts the value of such practices as determinative of fair use.
The risk that the best practices statements will come, like the Classroom Guidelines, to
stand for ceilings rather than floors on uses is particularly concerning since some of the
limitations are unwarranted and severe. For example, the Filmmakers’ Statement limits incidental
uses of music captured on film so that an editor and director cannot cut or edit a scene or
sequence to the beat of the captured music or allow the music to spillover to another scene.
Cutting to the rhythm of the music is an integral part of the craft of filmmaking and allowing
music from one scene to spillover during a scene is an important technique. The Filmmakers’
Statement also concludes that documentary films cannot be designed around copyrighted works.
Documentaries about war movies, the rock n’ roll star Elvis Presley, or the portrayal of gays and
lesbians in film and television are all legitimate projects, yet the Filmmakers’ Statement throws
them all into fair use purgatory or worse yet, infringement hell simply because they are designed
to comment on copyrighted material. Such a conclusion is out of sync with the needs of
filmmakers and the public. Other best practices statements similarly constrain users—for
example, the OpenCourseWare Code restricts uses of copyrighted works by educators to single
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examples and requires educators to remove incidentally captured copyrighted works. Moreover,
the statements suggest a preference for licensing when material easily can be licensed at
reasonable rates. This preference for licensing makes all unlicensed uses suspect and calls into
question whether the movement’s goals of encouraging fair use are furthered or in fact
undermined by these statements.
Recent legal scholarship has also sought to use custom to support fair use. In Michael
Madison’s analysis of fair use he contends that fair use can be made more predictable if it is
understood as protecting uses that fall within certain social and cultural patterns. He suggests that
conformity with community practices in one of these given patterns should insulate users from
liability for copyright infringement. For example, if a use is allegedly journalistic, then the norms
and practices of the journalistic community should be used to assess first if the use is in fact
journalistic in nature, and second, if it is, whether the use conforms with existing journalistic
practice. One of the main motivations for Madison’s analysis was to suggest that at least some
peer-to-peer file-sharing fits within an existing social and cultural pattern (of personal uses) and
therefore is fair. 33
Pamela Samuelson’s recent work on fair use similarly suggests that customary uses, at
least those by authors, merit fair use protection. She points to note-taking, quotations, close
paraphrasing, photocopying, and sketches as examples of activities that all promote authorship
and have long been considered fair when engaged in by those creating new works. 34 Samuelson
declares that “whether a second author’s use is reasonable and customary in the authorial
community in which he or she creates” is something courts should consider when evaluating fair
use. 35 Professor Samuelson views custom as an appropriate factor to consider, but she has agreed
with me that custom should not be the sole measure of fair use. 36
Although some on the copyleft see custom’s potential to support fair use, the realities of
the courts’ treatment of custom suggests that these advocates may be walking into a minefield.
Not only are there dangers that such projects will backfire, but reliance on such practices and
norms to shape fair use rests on normative and theoretical thin ice.
QUESTIONABLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USING CUSTOM AS A PROXY FOR FAIR USE
The recent efforts to advocate for the expansion of fair use on the basis of custom have
some appeal, but given the reality that courts have often used industry practices to narrow the
scope of fair use, one has reason to pause before advocating greater reliance on custom as a basis
for expanding or protecting uses of copyrighted works. Not only have courts looked to custom to
cabin rather than to expand fair use, but the public use and access rights to land rooted in custom
have largely become disfavored in the United States—our legal system has favored strong
private property rights even when they limit longstanding public uses of that property. It thus is
quite a stretch to think that customary use is the way back from the abyss of the anti-commons.
Even if we take a step back from this healthy dose of legal realism, there are reasons to question
the usefulness and appropriateness of custom as a proxy for what uses should be deemed fair.
The common law preferred custom not because it was superior, but because there was
little else in its place as a starting point. As James Carter Coolidge observed: “Custom [] is the
only law we discover at the beginning of society . . . .” 37 Now that we have a developed legal
system, custom should rarely be the measure of the law. Three of the primary justifications
advanced today for relying on custom in various contexts suggest that consideration of custom is
less justifiable in the copyright context than in many other circumstances. The first major
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justification for relying on custom to establish legal rules is that custom may best reflect optimal
rules in a given market. In common law terms this might be framed as “the community knows
best.” In the context of copyright transactions this would mean that custom would reflect the
optimal development of copyrighted works and a balance between the exclusionary owners’
rights and the public’s use and access rights to those works. In the context of copyright markets,
there are reasons to doubt the optimality of industry practices because they are often generated
by efforts to avoid litigation or preserve relationships. Licensing material or removing material
from new works is common not because it is optimal, but because the outcome of fair use
litigation is unpredictable and litigation itself is so expensive. Moreover, guessing wrong about
the likely success of a fair use defense comes with a severe downside—high statutory damages
and possible criminal liability. Such a risk makes it rare that parties who can obtain permission
for a reasonable (or even unreasonable) licensing fee will risk litigating fair use. This rational
choice by individual actors is not an optimal or preferred choice for society.
Another reason that copyright markets are less likely to generate welfare-maximizing
practices is that they are not particularly close-knit and have fewer repeat transactions between
the same parties, thereby contrasting with other industries and communities in which norms and
practices have been celebrated as preferential to externally imposed laws. The different economic
power of players in copyright markets also suggests that customs will likely skew toward the
interests of the most powerful owners of copyrighted content at the expense of others.
Despite such concerns, some, such as Richard Epstein, have argued in response to my
work that negotiated licenses and other clearance culture practices actually reflect optimal
private ordering based on mutually agreed to pricing. 38 There are a number of flaws with such a
conclusion. First, negotiating licensing agreements is challenging, especially for smaller players
or when a potential user has a limited amount of time to obtain permission for the use. Content
owners sometimes cannot be located or do not respond at all or in a timely manner to requests for
permission to license works. These challenges lead to significant transaction costs that warp the
market for these licenses. Second, content owners sometimes refuse to license at any price or
charge a prohibitively high or simply unreasonable fee for use. Third, because fair use works in
conjunction with the exclusive rights of copyright holders to promote the overall public interest
in generating more works and more knowledge, we cannot simply look at an individual
transaction and evaluate the optimality between the owner and user, as compared to litigation
costs——we must also consider the costs to society more broadly. Optimality in the sense of
maximizing wealth is not the only consideration at issue here. We must also maximize creativity,
knowledge, and liberty. Fair use is more than simply a mechanism for optimizing the production
of creative works; it prevents copyright law from unreasonably interfering with the free speech
and liberty rights of others. Given copyright’s status as a government entitlement such concerns
are particularly appropriate counterweights.
A second justification for incorporating custom is that even if suboptimal, the resulting
legal rules are fair because they satisfy parties’ expectations. 39 In the copyright context, however,
expectations often do not track the relevant customs, and even when they do, it may not be
appropriate to determine the scope of copyright law on the basis of such expectations given the
countervailing public interests at stake. For example, the New York Times recently hired a talent
agency to assist with licensing its news stories for use in television shows and movies. The New
York Times’s expectation that it can extract compensation for news that is in the public domain
or an industry practice of licensing such stories should not alter copyright law’s exclusion of
facts from its reach. Not only can expectations push the law in ways contrary to public policy,
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but expectations can also lock-in existing property regimes even when they are unjust and even
when the parties themselves might prefer a different arrangement. Such expectations may simply
reflect resignation rather than preferred rules.
The final common justification for incorporating custom is the furtherance of autonomy
interests. Early justifications for the common law expressed a preference for communities being
governed by their own customary laws that had evolved over a period of time. These laws not
only furthered parties’ expectations of how given behavior would be treated, but also injected a
degree of community self-governance and autonomy in what would otherwise be a suspect
rulemaking process handed down from a monarchy. Today, the democratic process allows
communities to contribute in a more orderly fashion to the creation of governing laws, and
accordingly, the appeal of the common law has faded. But even in contemporary legal debates,
the issue of whether laws should be driven by the private or public sphere continues to fuel many
discussions. Given copyright’s public-regarding goals, deference to private ordering is less
appropriate than in other business contexts.
Moreover, there are conflicting autonomy interests at stake. As I have discussed
elsewhere, non-owners have liberty and autonomy-based interests in using copyrighted works. 40
Copyright is a statutory grant of a limited property right in exchange for the public disclosure of
a work. There is a bargain worked by the legal protection that requires some relinquishment of
autonomy interests when one makes one’s copyrighted work public. Although a work is
copyrighted upon fixation regardless of whether it is published, infringement actions require
demonstration of access to the work, which usually requires having made it public. Additionally,
to the extent that a party wishes to monetize the copyrighted work it must be made public——
something it is assumed that authors and copyright holders will want to do. Thus, the autonomy
interests of an author must yield to those of her audience.
COMMON LAW LIMITS ON CUSTOM
Despite this critique of the wholesale incorporation of custom, custom continues to
provide some pertinent and meaningful information, including for evaluations of fair use. But
before considering the value of any particular custom, we need a system to distinguish the
practices and norms worthy of consideration from those that should be dismissed. The common
law provides some guidance on how to make such assessments.
Early common law scholars and courts had a much more moderated view of custom than
contemporary scholars sometimes recognize. William Blackstone and Matthew Hale in England,
and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in America, recognized that not all customs made for appropriate
legal rules. Practices and norms sometimes developed in a haphazard manner that created rules
that defied logic or that became obsolete given societal or technological changes. 41 The common
law therefore limited the use of custom in a number of important ways. Before being considered
worthy of legal recognition, a custom needed to be deemed both legal and good. 42 To meet this
standard, a custom had to pass a number of hurdles. Blackstone’s work provides the most famous
delineation of these common law limits on custom. Blackstone provides seven express limits on
custom; to be both legal and good customs must be “immemorial,” “continued,” “peaceable,”
“reasonable,” “certain,” “compulsory,” and “consistent.” 43 For purposes of this discussion I will
largely track Blackstone’s enumeration of these limits, but I will synthesize these limits into four
broad conceptual categories that best reveal these limits’ continued relevance. The four
conceptual categories that I use are first, limits that relate to the certainty of the custom; second,

9
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2183317

Copyright, Custom, and Lessons from The Common Law, Jennifer E. Rothman
limits that demonstrate the consent of the people to the custom; third, the absence of conflicts
between the custom and other laws and customs; and finally, the fourth limit, that the custom
itself must be reasonable.
Certainty
There are a variety of common law limits on custom that each addresses the certainty of
the custom. Before deserving judicial consideration, a custom must be proven to exist, and its
contours need to be clearly identifiable, definite, sufficiently detailed, and agreed upon. 44
Consent
Consent was the key justification for custom at common law, and many of the limits on
custom are at their root about whether the community agreed to the alleged practice or norm. The
continuity of the custom, its longevity and agreement about its contours, demonstrated a
consensus by a community with regard to the practice that suggested likely consent. 45 The
requirement that a custom must have been so longstanding or immemorial that no one could
remember a time without that custom being in place also reflected a community’s likely consent
to that custom. 46 Other evidence of consent was that the custom be peaceable. Peaceability
required demonstration that a custom was undisputed. This was an important component because
disagreements over a custom’s validity called into question the community’s consent to that
custom. The custom also needed to be compulsory in the sense that everyone in the relevant
community needed to follow that custom rather than having obedience to the custom be at the
“option of every man[.]” 47
Absence of Conflicts
Even if a custom were universally accepted, understood, and followed in a given
community, it might still violate a superior governing rule. Common law courts would therefore
analyze whether the given custom conflicted with any other custom or law. 48 This requirement
was sometimes referred to as requiring consistency. 49 Custom could not contradict laws set forth
by the King or by Parliament or other common law rules or customs in the same community. 50
Reasonableness
The courts would also consider whether the custom was reasonable, regardless of its
acceptance or duration. 51 The fact that something has been accepted and practiced for a long time
might reflect its wisdom, but more is meant by the reasonableness inquiry than mere deference to
the custom as a proxy for what is reasonable. Determination of whether a custom is reasonable
has long been a challenging inquiry. Blackstone noted that because of this courts often
considered a slightly different and easier inquiry—evaluating whether the custom was
“unreasonable.” 52 J.H. Balfour Browne writing in 1875 suggested that if there was no reason to
the contrary, one might defer to custom, but if there was reason to question whether the custom
was good, courts could reject the practice or norm. In particular, Browne focused on whether the
practice benefited the people. “A custom [] which is injurious to the public, which is prejudicial
to a class, and beneficial only to a particular individual, is repugnant to the law of reason. No
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such custom could be capable of becoming law which is a rule for the benefit of all.” 53 As
Jeremy Bentham observed: “To prove the existence of a practise is one thing, to prove the
expediency of establishing it by force of law is another.” 54 Bentham points to Lord Bacon’s
advice that one should “Let Reason be pregnant, Custom barren” to highlight his skepticism that
customary practices and norms are likely to reflect a preferred legal rule. 55 Similarly, the great
justice Benjamin Cardozo suggested that “social needs” justify “sacrific[ing] custom in the
pursuit of other and larger ends.” 56 Cardozo noted that while “history and custom have their
place,” “[e]thical considerations” and the “welfare of society” must rule the day. 57 Although
Cardozo observed that social welfare was difficult to determine and ethical considerations could
be contested, he pointed to fundamental underpinnings of our constitutional democracy that
could not be sacrificed in the name of custom or common law. 58
Despite these longstanding limits on custom, when courts and scholars consider the use
of custom in copyright law these limits have rarely been considered. Courts have simply not
scrutinized the quality and value of particular practices and norms in the copyright context.
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CUSTOM THROUGH A CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT LENS
The ignorance of common law limits may be driven in part by a lack of awareness that
courts are engaged with the analysis of custom; but, if custom is to have any influence in
intellectual property law, then a more thoughtful and nuanced view of it must be adopted. It is
therefore worth considering how one should evaluate custom today. Without limits on the
incorporation of custom we risk not only incorporating bad rules, but also shoring up a feedback
loop in which the law reinforces problematic practices and then further entrenches them into the
law. 59 We have seen this problem with particular prominence in the context of licensing markets
for copyrighted works.
The common law’s focus on certainty, consent, lack of conflicts and reasonableness are
all relevant today. As I have elaborated elsewhere, I do not think that custom should be
incorporated wholesale into determinations of fair use. Nevertheless, custom may provide some
guidance into what is reasonable or appropriate in a particular context, and thereby likely fair. In
the past, I have developed six vectors that should be evaluated when considering whether
practices or norms are useful indicators of fairness in the context of intellectual property. 60 Here I
will condense these into four primary areas of evaluation: (1) the certainty of the custom; (2) the
motivation for the custom; (3) the representativeness of the custom; and (4) the implications of
adopting the custom. I will briefly elaborate on each of these considerations and their
connections to the traditional common law limits on custom. As part of this analysis I will
consider a few relevant examples, especially the recently propounded best practices statement for
documentary filmmakers, and evaluate them in the context of fair use.
Certainty of the Custom
To have any value, a custom must be identifiable, in terms of what constitutes the practice
itself, and the practice must also be widely accepted and followed. This analysis tracks that of
Blackstone’s requirement that practices be certain before meriting judicial consideration. Several
considerations help to evaluate how certain a particular custom is. First, if there is unanimity as
to the contours of the custom among diverse parties it is more likely to exist and have clearly
definable boundaries. Such agreement confirms the likely consent of the community. Second,
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customs that are longstanding are more stable and hence more certain because they have
weathered the test of time.
Because the best practices statements are more wishful than descriptive and have fuzzy
boundaries, they are not particularly certain. Although the best practices statements purport to set
forth the practices of the relevant communities, they instead set forth what the drafters think the
community should be doing. In the context of the Filmmakers’ Statement, for example, the report
leading up to the statement and the statement itself both reveal that the dominant practice was to
license or cut out copyrighted materials from documentaries. If courts take seriously the call to
incorporate customary practices, then such clearance practices may narrow rather than expand
fair use. Second, under the guidelines of the Filmmakers’ Statement evaluations must be made of
whether the “extent of the use is appropriate,” quotes are no “longer than necessary” and
attribution was “reasonably possible.” These inquiries do not provide certain guidelines worthy
of deference as custom. Instead, they leave the same ambiguities of the existing fair use system,
but add an additional layer of complexity to the already convoluted fair use analysis.
In other instances, we see conflicting customs at work. For example, in the Roy Export
case described earlier—in which a court rejected fair use and First Amendment defenses for the
use of clips of Charlie Chaplin films in a news obituary of Chaplin—the court rejected fair use
on the basis that the defendant did not conform to custom. The court failed to consider, however,
that there was more than one custom at work. Clips were not usually licensed for obituaries even
though they were often licensed in other contexts for projects with more lead time or scripted
series. Such conflicting customs suggest either that the court needed to more carefully scrutinize
which custom was applicable or that there was no single, dominant, and widely-accepted custom
worthy of consideration.
Motivation for Custom
Motivation was not a common law limit on custom; however, sitting underneath the
understanding that custom was valuable was a belief that custom reflected the preferences of a
particular community. In other words, if the community had been asked to sit around and agree
to what the rule should be this is likely the rule they would have come up with—or at least if
such a rule had been suggested to them they would have agreed to it. In the context of copyright
then, the practices and norms that will be the most valuable will be those that reflect preferred
allocations between copyright holders’ and users’ interests rather than customs driven by
litigation avoidance. Litigation-avoidance norms arise when laws are uncertain or the expense of
litigation discourages resort to the legal system. Such norms do not reflect a preferred or
aspirational allocation between the exclusive rights of copyright owners and the ability of others
to use those works. Both the licensing practices exemplified in the Ringgold decision and the use
guidelines, like the Classroom Guidelines, are examples of such litigation-avoidance customs.
These reactive customs—developed to address the shortcomings of the legal regime—are not the
sort of aspirational, independently developed customs that others, such as Robert Ellickson, have
appreciated in other contexts.61 When customs have developed with aspirational motivations
behind them they are better indications of what is appropriate. In the context of fair use, practices
and norms should primarily be relevant only to the extent that they are indicative of what is
actually deemed “fair” by the relevant community rather than what that community thinks is
colorable or safe under the law.

12
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2183317

Copyright, Custom, and Lessons from The Common Law, Jennifer E. Rothman
As part of considering the motivation for a particular custom, courts should particularly
try to engage with whether the custom was intended to provide an appropriate balance between
competing interests. As a check on this analysis, courts should independently evaluate whether
reasonable people would agree to such rules if they knew neither whether they would be
powerful or minor players in the market nor whether they would own or wish to use the relevant
content.
Representativeness
The common law focus on the importance of custom reflecting the will and consent of the
people is instructive. Customs that represent only one party’s or one group’s interests are suspect.
By contrast, when a custom develops with input and participation of both copyright owners and
users and large and small players, it is more valuable. The best practices statements are highly
unrepresentative and therefore of limited value. Like the Classroom Guidelines (which the
authors of the best practices statements criticize for being one-sided), none of the best practices
statements included representation by the most affected parties—the content providers whose
work is most likely to be appropriated. The fact that some of the users are also authors does not
remedy this one-sidedness. After all, almost everyone—if not absolutely everyone—is an author
of copyrighted work. Although the proponents of the statements are likely correct that if they had
invited larger content owners to the table very little would have been agreed upon, the fact that
the parties could not have agreed to any common principles should raise serious flags about
using the articulated practices to affect entitlements outside of that community. Not only were the
copyright holders that were most likely to be injured by the uses not invited to the table, but the
public at large was not included even though the statements potentially limit the types of uses
that we can make.
Although not an explicit consideration at common law, the application of custom was
limited to the community that had developed the particular custom at issue. Customs were never
supposed to be applied outside the relevant community. Doing so would fly in the face of the
primary limit on custom—that it must demonstrate the consent of those governed by the practice
or norm. 62 It therefore is particularly inappropriate in the context of copyright law to apply
custom outside the community in which it developed.
Implications
Another way of thinking about the common law requirement that customs must be
independently evaluated to determine if they are reasonable is to consider the likely implications
of adopting such practices, not just in the immediate case but more broadly. Courts must
independently scrutinize the implications of adopting any customary practice or norm as a legal
rule. When evaluating the worth of a particular custom, a court must consider what the end result
of incorporating that custom would be. If followed to its logical conclusion, will the custom
result in a slippery slope, such that no uses will be allowed, or, alternatively, that too many uses
will be allowed? In either scenario, courts should reject customary practices. Consider, for
example, two extremes. If it is customary to license everything, then no fair uses remain. On the
flipside, consider the heyday of free peer-to-peer file-sharing in which the custom was not to pay
for any music downloaded from the web. Such a custom could destroy the entire market for
music online.
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In the best practices statement related to user-generated content (“UGC”) (in the context
of online video) virtually any use is deemed fair because the commentary and critique category is
read very broadly. For example, in the report supporting the Online Video Code, the drafters
suggest that a mash-up titled Clint Eastwood’s “The Office”—which mixed together clips from
the television series The Office with the movie Evan Almightly to show what it would be like if
Clint Eastwood directed an episode of The Office—falls within the favored category of negative
or critical commentary. This category and its exemplars suggest that all mash-ups are fair use.
This means that there can be no market for licensing such mash-ups; a conclusion that pulls the
rug out from under a possible new media market and makes copyright law virtually irrelevant in
the context of UGC.
In sum, if custom is certain, representative, motivated by aspirational purposes, and
would result in a reasonable allocation of use and ownership rights, then that custom will likely
provide meaningful guidance for evaluating fair use in that particular context. Otherwise, such
practices and norms should be met with great skepticism and little deference.
RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN COPYRIGHT
Despite the many reasons discussed to be cautious about jumping on the custom
bandwagon, custom provides a number of broader lessons for copyright policy. First, massive
disobedience of copyright law in given categories can signal market failure or overreaching by
copyright holders. The copyright system needs some public buy-in to work. Public support
requires people to think that on some level copyright law is fair. When copyright law is wildly
out of sync with community practices there may be value in interpreting copyright to conform to
those understandings or better yet amending the copyright act to reflect some of those norms.
Second, customary uses may demonstrate a consensus about preferred rights that may not
be appropriately recognized under the law. For example, many norms in the copyright world
favor giving attribution to authors when their work is used, but the law does not generally
recognize such a right. Such locations of commonality suggest promising areas for advocating
for legal change and the express adoption of commonly accepted principles.
Third, custom may demonstrate areas of need by users and creators that must be
accommodated either through a reasonable market mechanism or through fair use. There are a
number of categories of uses of copyrighted works that some scholars and courts have treated as
prima facie fair because they are “customary.” Although courts have mostly used custom to
reject fair use defenses, on several occasions courts have pointed to “years of accepted practice”
as a basis to establish fair use. In William & Wilkins Co v. United States, for example, the Court
of Claims held that the practice of making copies for research purposes was a customary fair
use. 63 Many of these “customary uses” are simply uses that have been established at common
law and now exist because they are uncontroversial legal precedents. Over time, these precedents
form categories of uses that are likely (and predictably) fair—but this is a very different
understanding than that they are fair because they are customary. In other words, one way of
thinking about customary uses is simply as precedents.
Additionally, the normative underpinnings of these decisions are much more important
than their customary nature. Consider, for example, the “customary” use of copyrighted works in
biographies. 64 As with personal copies for research, we have seen practices in the context of
biographical works shift over time toward a permission-only culture. Instead of adopting
customary uses or industry practices wholesale then, we should evaluate the specific practices
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that have developed and consider whether they are appropriate. Permitting some uses of
copyrighted works in biographical works is necessary. The fact that such uses have been
permitted over time may signal the importance of such uses, but it should not be dispositive.
Similarly, if such uses cease to occur because of risk-averse publishing houses, the reasonable
use of copyrighted works in biographies should nevertheless remain fair.
A fourth insight from custom and the common law comes from the common law
requirement that a custom must be consented to by the relevant community. This requirement of
consent suggests an important avenue for counteracting the incorporation of the clearance
culture—active, vocal and public dissent from these restrictive practices. I have previously
advocated for such dissent from the dominant and restrictive practices in intellectual property
markets. 65 One of the purported values of using custom to set the law is that it reflects a “shared
sense of its reasonableness and historical appropriateness.” 66 When it does not, the custom is
neither legal nor good.
Finally, the common law provides at least one other important insight. The acceptance of
some customary uses of private lands was limited to those uses that were rooted either in
subsistence or communal recreation. Similarly, public use of copyrighted works is appropriate
when the uses are for subsistence rather than exploitation, and sometimes also when uses
facilitate community-building. What does subsistence mean in the context of copyright? From
the perspective of users, certain copyrighted works cannot be substituted for and form an
important part of both personal and cultural identity and expression—accordingly there must be
some ability to use such works without permission or payment. 67 With this in mind, compare two
different types of uses: first, the use of limited film clips for illustrative and historical purposes in
a documentary (or even fiction film); second, unlicensed peer-to-peer filesharing that reflects the
need to access music in digital formats quickly. The former might be an appropriate fair use even
if there is a licensing market, whereas the latter might only be fair until an alternative market
mechanism forms. The enumerated Section 107 categories also signal areas where subsistence
rather than exploitation usually rules. For example, one must be able to quote from copyrighted
works to provide meaningful scholarly commentary, reporting or review of such works.
A CODA: OVERLAPPING STATUTES AND THE COMMON LAW
There has long been disagreement among legal scholars about whether legislation—
passed by a representative government—or judge-made (or judge-declared) law purportedly
interpreting or incorporating community practice is more reflective of the will of the people.
Today, arguments about public choice and legislative capture suggest that even if one prefers
legislative rulemaking to incorporating custom, one should be concerned about whether the
public interest is being served in today’s legislative bodies, especially in the context of
intellectual property law. Custom is an attractive counterpoint to such dangers, but it is also
fraught with its own risks. The United States and particularly copyright law has veered toward
legislation over custom, but the interpretation and application of that legislation has long been
informed by practices and norms. As Justice Cardozo wrote in the 1920s with regard to the
United States legal system: “[W]e look to custom, not so much for the creation of new rules, but
for the tests and standards that are to determine how established rules shall be applied. When
custom seeks to do more than this, there is a growing tendency in the law to leave development
to legislation.” 68 Custom can provide valuable information, but its usefulness depends on
independently evaluating the worthiness of the custom and particularly scrutinizing its
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reasonableness and its likely reflection of a community’s consent to the relevant practice or
norm. The common law has told us this for hundreds of years, now all we need to do is listen.
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